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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DEVON PATRICK HARDCASTLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
NELDON HARDCASTLE,
Defendant and Resp~ondent,
and

Case No.
7423

ORDELL HARDCASTLE,
Interpleaded Defendant atnd
Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appellant's statement of facts, on the material issues here, is subject to the observation that it sometimes
states, as facts, the testimony of ap·pellant 's witnesses,
even though these were controverted, or the testimony
of appellant was such that the court was not required to
believe it and did not find it to be true.
Chronologically, and on non-controverted matters,
the statement is reasonably accurate. It will be corrected,
and supplemented, 'briefly, on some matters deemed to be
material to the issue involved.
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The findings recited ''that through the action of
the Juvenile Court, both parties here were on the 13th
day of September, 1944, deprived of the custody of the
minor child of the parties hereto, and the custody of
the said child was awarded to 0Tdell Hardcastle, the
mother of the defendant herein, and that said child, since
the date of said order of the Juvenile Court, to-wit, September 13, 1944, has lived with and has been cared for
by the said Or dell Hardcastle.''
I

It was then ordered and decreed that Ordell Hardcastle, the said grandmother, be and she was by the
decree unconditionally ''awarded the care, custody, and
control of the minor child . . . Janet, age 2% years.''
At the time of the Juvenile Court proceeding, aforesaid, N eldon Ha.dcastle, the father, was overseas in
the Service, an.d was not in a position to care for the
child, except as he had provided an allotment out of his
servi·ce pay to the child's mother.
The child had, in fact, been cared for by its grandmother ahnost continuously from the time that it was
born.
It is true that DeVon testified that she did not know
anything about any proceeding in the Juvenile Court,
but she also testified (122) that the Red Cross, soon after
her arrival in Portland, in September of 1944, was asking her ''to send the money to the Judge,'' and to sign
a slip, so that the Judge would get some of the money,
and that she did so. This could only be the Judge of the
J uvenille Court, as no other proceedings were pending at
that time. N eldon testified ( 174) that in response to
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his letter to her to n1ake the $30.00 available for Janet,
De Von \vrot that he should not ''·try to give his mother
all the credit; that she had already arranged, through the
Juvenile Court, to have the $30.00 sent to my mother."
By the statute, the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction
\vould depend upon its determination of neglect or dependency. It awarded the custody of Janet to Ordell
Hardcastle, its grandmother, in 1944. While the Judge
referred to this as being a temporary arrangement, it
\Ya:s apparently temporary, awaiting the return of
Janet's father from the Service. The Red Cross had been
working in connection with the Juvenile Court, and had
been investigating De\7- on in ApTil and May of 1944,
while she was till here ( 273).
Issues in this Case:

It is important to note that this case arises on a
petition to modify the divorce decree entered at the
instances of De\Ton Hardcastle, the plaintiff, on May 8,
1946.· It has to be assumed, on this proceeding, that there
wa~ good ground for placing the custody, as it was
ordered in that decree. This procedure has to be based
on changed conditions, affecting the child, after that
decree was entered. This seems to be uniformly held,
and has been the position that has been taken by this
Court, under the provision of our statute giving the
District Court jurisdiction over the matter of the property and children of divorced parents.

Osmus v. Osmu.s, 198 P. (2) 233.
'rhe petition here a;ppears to recognize this situation.
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It alleges one change ; this is a change in the financial
condition in the mother, DeVon.
It does allege that the home of the grandrnother is
not a satisfactory home for the child, but does not allege
any changes in the conditions there, after the fortner
decree in 1948.
As to the home, the evidence shows,- without dispute;
that the conditions, as referred to in the allegation of
the petition, have steadily improved; that, at the time the
child was originally placed therein, there were eight
children of the Hardcastles there, and that, at the time
of the filing of this petition, there were. only four of
their children ( 121) ; that the house, as indicated by the
appellant's statement here, had been somewhat remodeled; that running water had been placed therein ; that
bath and toilet fixtures had been acquired and were ready
for installation, when the necessary help could be obtained.
It is alleged in the petition, in paragraph 2 thereof,
that, when the decree was entered, it was agreed and
understood ''he tween plaintiff, defendant and the said
Ordell that plaintiff could have the custody of her child
whenever her circumstances were such as to enable her
to properly ~p~rovide for said child and furnis:Q. her with
a suitable home.'' There was no evidence to support this
allegation, whatsoever.
The only evidence on the matter at all was an intimation on the part of DeVon's own attorney, upon her
testimony, that she might take some proceeding later to
get the child. It is very evident that any effort on her
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part, at that tirne, would have bee~ seriously resisted by
Keldon, the father of Janet. Her testimony showed that,
when it \Yas indicated in the first cornplaint that the
custody \Yould not be given to his mother ( 195), he went
out and hired an attorne)~, ~1r. Critchlow. That he was
prepared to fight out the matter of taking the custody
fron1 Or dell ( 195-197) ..
So, this petition rests entirely on the sole issue
presented, as to the. alleged improved financial condition of De\; on. No authority has been cited that this is
sufficient to modify a custody decree, and the cases,
as \Ve shall show, are strongly to the contrary.
This is also a case where an attempt is made, on this
ground alone, to 1nodify a decree, so as to permit the
removal of a child from the jurisdiction of the Court,
and frou1 the State, and from the place of residence of
the other parent.
There are many cases, where such attempt at · removal has been held to be ground for modifying a decree,
so as to keep the child within the jurisdiction· of the
Court. On the other hand, the cases have consistently
held that, wherever possible, the child should be kept
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Alley v. Alley, 247 P. 301. In this case, this Court,
at Page 304 of this report, said:
''. . . There is no good reason made to appear in this case why the father should longer
be deprived of the custody and control of his own
child. In every case where the welfare of a child
of tender age is in question, the courts should
rx(lreise great care to subserve the best interests
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of such child, and in determining the question of
custody and control should, if possible, always
maintain control of the child and retain it within
the jurisdiction of the court so as to protect it
against harmful influences and to preserve its
welfare and the rights of all interested parties.
There is nothing 1nade to appear in this case,
however, which would affect the welfare of the
child by giving it into the custody· of the natural
father.''
In this case, it has been developed, also, as affecting the alleged right of the mother, that there was complete abandonment by her of the custody of the child,
as early as 1943. We will develop this point on the argument.

Further St-atement:
It is stated, by app~ellant, in connection with the
above matter, that Ordell Hardcastle refused to let the
child go, and that she stated that a sheriff would be required to take the child away.
This was after the child, and its clothes, chair, and
basket and birth-certificate, had been definitely turned
over to Ordell, with the statement that she could have
Janet, and that DeVon would sign any papers for that
purpose.
It should also be considered, in the light of the
statement by the respondent (p. 3), of the fact that
DeVon's father had threatened the baby and had beaten
her. Also, that the child's father had learned of this,
while still in this country in the Service. ( 172)), and had
written to his mother to take care of the baby. Also,
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in connection with the fact that 0Tdell was advised that
appellant had stated to the sheriff that appellant would
rather kill the baby than have Ordell keep her, and that
the sheriff had 'varned Or dell to watch the baby ( 267).
It is certain, fron1 the very character of Or dell, as
i~ indica ted by this record, that, under those circumstances, including the request of her son, she would have
fought to protect J a.net.
This temporary demand for the baby, prior to
De\Ton's leaving for Portland, and after being piqued
because of the argument with Bonnie, was, doubtless, as
Or dell testified, a ''passing fancy'' ( 266).
It is inconsistent for appellant to argue that the
reason she did not want the child was because she had no
place to keep her in her quarters at Portland, and, also,
that she really \vanted the child at that tilne.
The fact, as disclosed from this record, is that she
never really 'vanted her until 1948, when she thought
she had gained some affluence, and that then, it was not
because of any great love or affection for the child, but,
rather, to show her mother-in-law, and the neighbors,
that she had procured a position of some standing and
power. This is, apparently, tinged with some indication
of jealousy or resentment.

ARGUMENT
We will pursue appellant's points, in the order pre~ented. In discussing the first point, we will assume that
the Court's findings, as questioned by appellant in later
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points, are fully sustained by the record. We will establish this, as these points are each taken up.

POIN'T NO. I
On this point, appellant states that she is aware
that'' in many cases, financial ability is viewed with limited concern." This is true, and the change in such condition is, clearly, the only change that can be relied upon
here. App·ellant cites no case in which any custody
decree has been changed by reason of such changed
condition.
We agree that the welfare of the child is a controllingfactor. We do not agree that such welfare is determined
by a temporary affluence of a second husband of the
mother.
We agree that it has been determined that the
mother has no absolute right to the custody of a child.
Samps·ell v. Holt, 202 P. (2) 550.
Appellant has cited some cases where custody was
awarded to the mother, for reasons which do not exist
here. We have no quarrel with the law quoted therefrom.
These eases do not deal, at all, with the question o.f
changing a decree on the ground of financial change,
alone.
We will now cite a few of the ''many cases,'' as
referred to by appellant. These are picked out of the
Fifth Decennial, Vol. 17, beginning at Page 505.
Myers_ v. Myers, 179 S.W. (2) 865 (Arkansas). A
betterment in financial condition of mother since entry
of divorce decree awarding custody of son to father was
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of little significance as constituting a "'change in circunlstances' · requiring transfer of custody to mother, since
eourt had ample jurisdiction to require father to provide
for child, even if custody was awarded to mother.
lVilliants ·z'. Willia~ns, 51 N.E. (2) 284, 320 Ill. App.
35-±. 'Vhere a father \Yas contributing amply to the
support of an infant son whose custody had been awarded
to the n1other by divorce decree, that infant n1ight he
deprived of a re1nainder interest in a trust valued at
$125,000 unle~s child's custody be transferred to the
father \vas entitled to little consideration in determining
\velfare of the child.
Leve.rich c. Le,z:erich, 152 P. (2) 303 (Oregon). This
is one of the cases above referred to. We quote:
~Ioreover,

the appellant has failed to show
a change of conditions, since the entry of the
decree, which would warrant the court in modifying it \Vith res·pect to custody of the child. It is
the ~ettled rule that such decrees are final, and
may not be modified unless changed conditions
are shown, indicating, to the satisfaction of the
court, that the modification would be for the best
inteTests of the child. (Citing authorities). The
burden of making such a showing was upon the
appellant, who was the moving party. (Citing
authority). She failed to sustain it. The only
showing of changed conditions which she made
was that she herself is now married to the man
for 'vhon1 she left her first husband, and that
they have acquired a desirable residence. She
made no attempt whatever to show that the child's
father was in any respect incompetent to ca.re for
it. The party seeking the change should sho'v
d
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that the other party has become unfit to be the
custodian, or, at the least, that the proposed
change in custody would result in the child's
receiving better care than he is receiving from
the other. (Citing authorities). l\lere improvement in financial or other material circumstances
of the party denied custody of the child is not
sufficient in itself to justify a change. (Citing
authority).''
Schorno v. Schorno, 172 P. (2) 474. Where the court
said:

''The fact that respondent's financial standing has very greatly improved would not afford
any ground whatever for taking the young children from appellant. . . . Respondent argues
that he desires to train the boys to become dairy
farmers, and, in due time, to send them to college
to continue their technical training. Questions of
this nature may become im;portant several years
in the future, but, at this time, are unimportant."
The qualities of industry, character, stability, and
good citizenship, in which the Courts and the State are
interested, do not result from affluence. They are promoted by su.ch care and training and treatment as Janet
has received and will receive where she is.
Something is attempted to be made of the fact that
DeVon is the natural mother, and Ordell the grandmother. This is not at all .conclusive as to the welfare
of Janet. The grandmother is a blood relationship.
DeVon has been the mother only in that she gave birth
to Janet. Here, the grandmother watched over the birth,
and provided, and paid for, the hospitalization, including
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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extra 1noney for a priYate roon1 because De\' on srnoked,
( 2S:2) and, fron1 then on, Ordell has been the real n1other

in every respect.
Janet calls her '~ 11 ama ·' ( 180). She is the only real
mother this child has eYer known. Here is the only real
home the child has ever had. She took her out of trouble
\vhen she \Vas a month, or less old, and vvhen she, with
her birth certificate, vvas turned over, and nursed her
to health. She has protected and fed and clothed her
provided insurance for her medical treatments, and cared
for her in danger and sickness ( 245) ; even that occasioned by her fear that De'Ton would take her away
(233); has looked after religious training, and, at five
years, her kindergarten training ( 239). This record shows
there could hardly be a better mother. The neighbors
all ~ay so. They testify, also, to. the deep feeling of affection existing between this grandmother and the child. The
Court found this ''deep and enduring love'' to exist (49).
It would take too much space to cite all the evidence,
showing the love of Janet for her grandmother, or her
reciprocal love. It could hardly be deeper, or more ger~
uine ( 244). Janet's father testified that "she .loves
mother Inore than she will ever love me or her mother''
( 176), and "they are about as close as two peoi_Ple can
get" ( 181) .
He, incidentally, has shown much more affe-ction and
concern for Janet's welfare than has DeVon. He has
visited her once, or more weekly, as stated by respondent; has taken her to his home a few times, but could
not keep her, because she wanted to get back to 0-rdell
.._

I
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immediately (181). He has petitioned and testified, asking that she be kept within the Court's jurisdiction.,
where the Court can protect her, and here, where he can
see that she is taken care of. He should know of Janet's
feelings, and he says that, to take her away, would
break the hearts of both her and her grandmother ___ _
Janet ''would die.'' (181).
Appellant's counsel got one neighbor witness, on
cross-examination, to say that t.T anet was a sort of
•'happy-go-lucky child.'' On this is expressed an opinon
that she would go along and forget about everything,
and readjust. Perhaps this is assumed in Russia's separation of families, also, but it is not so. It is not based
on an understanding of the feeling of children of this
age, or of Janet's feelings. Adjustment by her, or her
grandmother, to a world without each other, would be
far from easy.
There is no difference in the shock that would occur
to this child, if taken from her home and grandmother,
than that to any normal child, taken from its own devoted
mother. Perhaps, it would he greater, because she has
had to fight this fear, on different occasions, upon
reports from neighbors, and at the time of the Juvenile
Court hearing in 1948, when she spoke for herself (180},
and at which time she became hysterical, and would cry
out in the night the whole time her mother was here,
and became ill. ( 233).
'This is emphasized further, as is also the kind of
child she has come to be, by her acts to protect herself;
such as the occasion when she went from Sunday School
\
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to the hon1e of Bishop Hardcastle, her uncle, in order that
her n1other 'vould not kno\Y ''"here to find .her (164, 166,
235) ; and the occasion when she went to the neighbor
(159-160), and undertook to arrange for their dog to
protect her.
Somewhat similar situations to this one have been
discussed in the following cases, decided by this Court.

State v. Sorensen, 132 P. (2) 132. The child had been
placed with the Sorensens, and the father thought to
regain possession on allegations that conditions had
changed, since the finding of the Juvenile Court that ·~he
child "\Yas neglected.
This Court referred to certain prior Utah cases, discussing the alleged paramount right of a parent, and
stated that the principles therein were not applicable to
the situation presented; that there was no presurnption
of this kind which could prevail against the interests
and welfare of the child; and a number of other case,
in which a parent was attempting to regain possession
and custody of a minor child decreed to others, and said:
"It thus app·ears that where an order of the
court has been n1ade awarding custody of a minor
child to a particular indiyidual, such order will
not thereafter be modified without showing a
change in conditions or circumstances meriting
such modification.''

Kurtz v. Christensen, 209 P. 340. In this case, the
child was illegitimate, and the mother, being abandoned
by the father, consented that the child be adopted by the
(lefendants. They were not related to the child. They
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kept the child for about three years, when the parents
were reunited and married, and brought the action to
obtain possession. The opinon of the Court said:
''In this case we are constantly reminded, in
the brief and argument of plaintiffs' counsel, that
by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs are
natural parents the law favors them. It is also
contended in plaintiff's behalf that their social
station and their financial ability to care for and
properly rear their own child equal those of the
defendants; that these considerations, coupled
with the admitted fact that since the birth of
the child plaintiff's have become husband and \vife
and are very much de,- nted to each other, should
have prompted the trial court to overlook all their
past indiscretions and to give back to them the
child of their own flesh and blood to nurture and
rear to womanhood. 'The entering into the
marriage relation and the present attitude of the
plaintiffs toward each other are most commendable, For these things the whole world must applaud.''
''The undispua ted facts are that the home
environments of this little child are now most
ideal. That they will continue to be, and that she
will be reared to a splendid womanhood with the
defendants, seems assured. She knows no other
parents, and her affections are so entwined with
theirs that a separation would mean the uprooting of all that makes for the good and happiness
of child life. The plaintiffs' previous conduct
alone has brought about her present relationship
to the defendants.''
The Court says that there was nothing to justify
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breaking the alliance w·hich had thus gro"\vn up. It also
points out that, where a parent has surrenderd her child
in infancy, and it has been allo,ved to ren1ain with others
until ne\v ties of mutual affe.ction are formed, the child's
welfare 'vill control the parents' rights.
Wallick v. v;an.ce, 289 P. 103. In this case, the father
gave the child to the child's grandmother and to his
sister, with the apparent intention of their having permanent custody. The child's mother had died, when the
child was thirteen months old. About that time, her
father took the child to her grandmother's ho~e.
He claimed there was no agreement to leave the
child permanently; she was merely left there. The father
afterward married, and obtained a position, and sought
the child, on the ground that he was in condition to properly take care of her, 'earning a good, salary, etc.
Mter stating that, where there is an apparent gift
of a child, and the child is thereafter left and neglected
by the parent, he may be held to have lost his natural
and parental rights to its custody, and the Court said:
''Furthermore, if the parties to whom the
custody of a child is thus committed rely thereon
and accept and assume the duties and obligations
to nurture and maintain the child, and in so doing
use extensively of their means and physical energies for a period of years, and all the while there
were forming strong mutual attachments of the
affections by reason of such associations, it may
well be held that they have acquired rights with
respect to its custody and control which are paramount to the rights of the parent. Humel v. PMrish, supra; H~arrison v. H arkett, supra.''
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W~alto.n.

v. Cofj'marn, 169 P. (2) 97. This case holds

that any presumption that it will be for the best interest
and welfare of the child to be reared under the care,
custody and control of its natural parents is one of fact
and not of law, and may be overcome by any competent
evidence which is sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind
thereon.
The mother was seeking to get custody of her two
children away from their grandmother. She was divorced
from the father of the children, and remarried, and during a time was required to work. She lived with her
parents for a while, remarried, leaving one of the children, Bobby, 'vith her ;parents, and taking Marilyn with
her. There was some dispute as to how long Bobby had
lived with his grandparents, but neither of the children
lived with the grandparents anywhere near as continuously or for such a ·period of time as did Janet here.
There was also a proceeding in the Juvenile Court,
and, by stipulation, the matter was finally tried in the
District Court, as here. There were some admissions of
previous misconduct on the part of the mother, and evidence of reform and change in this respect, and the contention that she had never intended permanently to surrender the custody of the children.
The Court indicated that this appeared to be true,
at least so far as Marilyn was concerned. The Utah cases
are reviewed at some length, particularly on the question
of surrender of right of custody. This is very much more
apparent in the case at bar, than in the case under consideration.
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The Court points out the consideration to be given
to the findings of the trial court, and that, while the
Supreme Court, in this character of action, may reexamine the records, it is said:
'~In

so doing we should keep in n1ind that
the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses and
observed their demeanor and was acquainted with
the circun1stances surrounding the giving of their
testimony, and therefore was in a better position
than we are to weigh and evaluate their evidence.
Sta.n.Zey v. Starnley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465, concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe cominencing
at page 527 o~ 97 Utah, 94 P. 2d 465.''
Custody was by this Court awarded to the grand-·
mother.
Another thing that is particularly important here is
the inconclusiveness of the evidence to establish the
com~plete reliability and stability of D·eVon, in the case at
bar, as of the mother in the case under consideration.
The following language is particularly pertinent here:
''The only real home that Bobby ha.s known
is the home of the defendants, and Marilyn has
lived there much of her life. Both are attached
and adjusted to the home life of the defendants,
and the defendants are very much attached to
them. 'These children are more attached to the
defendants than to their own mother. This was
demonstrated by Marilyn on the last night when
her mother left the defendant's home. As she
left, Virginia asked Ma.rilyn if she was not coming, but Marilyn did not go with her. At that time
her grandmother had no opportunity to teach
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her to rnake that choice because 1iarilyn had been
living with her mother. Again when Virginia
attempted to take the children by force both resisted her. Twice during the trial each when questioned privately by the trial judge chose to go
to their grandparents.''
All the foregoing cases were decided prior to Sampsell v. Holt, supra, holding that the statute gives no
absolute right of custody to the mother.
The following quite recent cases, from other jurisdictions, hold that a parent may waive, by act or conduct, any preferred claim of right of custody, and is
not entitled to take a child, when placed or left with
grand or foster-parents until an attaclunent grows up
between them and the child.
Haynes v. Fi.Zlner (Mont.) 75 P. (2) 802.

(This case cites cases fron1 several other jurisdictions. Some of these consider the happiness
of the child as an elen1ent of its welfare.)
Graves v. French (Ark.) 191 S.W. (2) 590.
Hart v. Howell (Fla.) 19 So. (2) 317.
We recognize, as do the cases, that a child is not
a chattel, to be given away regardless of its own welfare.
But, it seems, also, to he universally re-cognized that,
where a parent voluntarily places a child with a grandparent, and thus establishes and acquiesces in this new
relationship, any 'original right of the parent is not of
conclusive importance.
Sorne of the matters, more appropriately discussed
under the following ·points, apply to this Point No. 1, also.
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POINT NO. II
This point is that the finding, quoted by appellant,
is not supported by the evidence..On the a.rgmnent, however, no effort is 1nade to show that it was not supported.
It is contended, only, that something additional, and as
to the Juvenile. Court's jurisdiction being temporary,
should have been found.
While this finding is supported, it, of itself, is of
no great i1nportance. If not supported, it would not have
any affect upon the conclusions and judgments of the
court. The findings, however, in this divorce proceeding
recited ( 6) that both parents of Janet ''were deprived of
the custody of the minor child'' by the Juvenile Court,
and the custody awarded to the mother of defendant.
Apparently, DeVon had neglected to a~pply the Navy
allotment to the care. of Janet, and the Red Cross
started investigating this in April or May of 1944, and
had contacted the Juvenile Court in this connection.
They and the father, N eldon, had also contacted DeVon.
POINT NO. III
This point is that there is no evidence to support
the finding quoted at Page 34 of appellant's brief, and
that this is contrary to the evidence.
If this contention is correct, it may be of some,
although not conclusive, importance here. It is, however, not correct.
The first finding, that it does not appear that appellant owns any property in her own right is true, by
the record. The home and the stock interests and salary
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rnentioned by Mr. Oliver, were testified as being owned
by hin1. This is not denied.
The finding goes to the matter of certainty or permanence of the affluence asserted as a financial change,
so far as DeVon is concerned. There was no testimony
that she owns any property. California community property law cannot be asserted here, without its being
pleaded, nor do we understand that it provides that she
has a present interest in her huband's property, or that
it prevents.him from holding p-roperty, and, particularly,
if acquired before marriage, in which she would never
have a community interest.
The findings that De\ 1 on did not contribute to
Janet's support, when she might ;have done so, and that
there is no evidence of any great affection for Janet,
will be considered together.
She testified ( 108) that, while working in the shipyard in Portland, she received as much as $85.80 a week
( 109). That her checks were not uniform, and this one
was as high as any she recalls getting. When she was
. getting this salary, at least for some time, she was also
getting the $80.00 per month allotment from the Navy,
and she got $50.00 of this all the time from December
1943 up to Dece1nher 13, 1945, when N eldon was discharged ( 121, 173).
If we count only four weeks to the month, to allow
for variance in these monthly checks, this would amount
to $353.20 per n1onth, plus the $80.00, or $433.20. She
says she did contribute but not any specific amounts.
Her testimony is very· illusive. She said, ''I don't know;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
so1netimes a Ten Dollar bill; son1etimes Twenty'' ( 109).
She did not remen1ber giving Janet ''any presents at
that time. ' '
Ordell Hardcastle testified, and her testilnony,
throughout, was entitled to full belief, that DeVon sent
$20.00, only. That this 'vas sent to Bonnie; $5.00 .to pay
a debt, and $15.00 for Janet, and that this $15.00 was
all she ever did send or give for Janet's support,
although she did give Janet $10.00 as a gift, and this,
Janet still had at the time of trial ( 323).
There were some few trinkets and items of clothing
received by Janet by or through DeVon's mother, over
the six years. These were not of any great value or
importance.
Oertainly, DeVon, living in the dormitory with
other girls in Portland, as she testified (111-112), could
have contributed to Janet's support substantially and
regularly, at that time.
That she has not contributed since being married
to Mr. Oliver is true, by. all the festmony. This is significant, now that it is claimed she can allegedly supply
Janet with all the comforts and luxuries of life.
She was married to her second husband November
9, 1946, and started proceedings for the custody of
Janet in the Juvenile Court August 13, 1948. During that
~period, and ever since, she has supplied no support,
when, by her own testimony, she could have aided substantially. 'This part of the finding is fully supported.
As to the finding that ''there is no evidence of great
affection'' for Janet, the foregoing, and the entire record,
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support this. There are some incidents particularly
emphasizing it.
On May 29, 1944, DeVon called Ordell to go to Bingham and take the baby. Ordell had gone to the hospital,
because her husband had been sent there. This was after
the threat to Janet, and the wire from the father, N eldon,
asking Or dell to look after Janet.
At Binghan1, she found nobody at the home of
D·e\Ton's mother, and inquiries, up to 12:30 that night,
failed to locate them. At 4:00 o'clock in the morning,
De\Ton and some fellow came to Ordell's home, bringing
the baby and its basket, chair, and clothes (220). It
was then that De\' on said, ''Here is the baby; you can
have her," and that she would sign any papers.
And now, this uncontradicted testimony: ''And
fron1 then on, every ti1ne that baby was in our house, she
never took care of her one bit.'' And, also from that
tiiue on, ''she didn't say anything about wanting the
baby.''
DeVon was there the next three months, almost con.:.
tinuously. Janet was six months old. She must have
required, and was given, a lot of care by Ordell. Yet,
there is no claim that De Von gave her any.
There is another instance, connected with Janet's
allegedly being without shoes. DeVon testified that she
had no shoes on, and that Ordell said that she had no
shoes ( 116). · This was in August of 1948, after she
had become affluent. And, though she pretended she
believed that this child had no shoes, she did nothing
about it. Incidentally, Ordell testified that the child was
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out 'vith 'One of the boys, 'vho was irrigating the orchard,
and that she had taken off her shoes to wade in the
furrows ( 230).
It see1ns significant that neither DeVon nor her
husband have tendered anything here for the years of
expense and service in the care of Janet. On the other
hand, they are continuously building up expenses, which
Ordell has been and is compelled to pay, in order to
protect Janet against, what she sincerely believes to be
threatened, fear, abuse, or neglect. This includes, what
seems to us to be, the unjustifiable ap·peal of this ca.se.
It, also, serves to emphasize the great devotion of Ordell
to this child.
De\7. on left here in August or September of 1944.
There is no compelling reason shown for her going away
from the baby at that time. She had been getting and
keeping the $80.00 allotment, including the baby's portion
of $30.00, since December of 1943. If she wanted to
work, it is common knowledge that jobs were plentiful
here, at good pay, in 1944. She then chose not to be
near the child.
She came back, and saw her only when she came
for some other purpose, as for her divorce in 1946, and
to instigate proceeding in 1948. It all adds up to the
complete support of the Court's finding. These findings
clearly support the conclusion and judgment here.
We have ignored the testimony of appellant as
to DeVon's living conditions and sister's health at the
time she got her divorce, in 1944. This was on the allegation of an agreement, at that time, that appellant
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could have the child when her circumstances were such
that she could care for it (14). This was not shown.
Appellant, while reciting this evidence at some length,
apparently claims nothing for it. And, the Court's
finding ( 49) that there was no such understanding, and
that no such suggestion ever reached Ordell, is fully
supported, and not questioned here. The award of custody to Ordell in 1946 must be presumed to rest upon
good reason therefor. These were not questioned, or
gone into, and, it seems, could not be, on this petition.

POINT NO. IV
This point is that the finding, or conclusion, of the
Court that the "ultimate" best interests of the child
will be served by leaving her custody with the grandmother is contrary to the evidence.
Appellant does not quite accurately state this. It is,.
as follows (51) :
•'6. The background of deep devotion, affection, and care by Ordell Hardcastle to and for
the child Janet, and the mutual love and affection
between them, assures that the welfare of the
child is safe in this custody and care, and that her
well-being will he best assured by keeping her
within the jurisdiction of the court and within the
area of her father's responsibility. There is no
sufficient evidence or background in referenee to
the relationship between Janet and plaintiff as
to safely assure that the child's welfare or best
interest would be served by modifying the dec.ree
herein, so as to allo'v her re1noval fron1 the State
of Utah."
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This follows other findings, conclusively detertnin-

lng:
1. That the conditions of the ho1ne of Janet have,
in all respects, in1proved since the time Janet was placed
there by her n1other and by the Juvenile and District
Courts (50), and are still in1proving. The finding, further, is that there is nothing in the conditions or environment of the home that threaten the health or wellbeing of Janet. These findings are supported, and not
questioned here.
2. And, it is found, as stated above, and fully sup•ported, that there was no understanding that the decree
of May 8, 1946, in this case, as to custody, ~ould or
could thereafter be modified or changed, or the reasons
therefor impeached. This finding is not questioned.
The only other matter alleged as basis for changing
the custody, as decreed, has to do with the alleged change
or betterment in' the financial conditions of De Von. The
Court finds, in this connection, that the background and
devotion of Ordell, and their mutual love, insures that
the child's welfare is safe in her custody. It indicates
that the evidence is insufficient as to the background of
DeVon, to give the same insurance.
Appellant dwells at considerable length upon DeVon's youth. She was, and is, young. At the time thiS
proceeding was brought, she was, apparently, 19 or
20 years old. She is entitled to sympathy, .because of this
lack of experience in meeting her problems, and, if she
made slips, most of us can be tolerant of these, and
everyone, we think, would be pleased if she should come
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to acquire the fine qualities of character, stability, and
industry that Ordell now has.
However, neither sympathy for her youth nor desires for the future can affect the decision as to the security of Janet, which the trial court was required to, and
did, make. The Court, on this, had to deal with conditions as they are.
Appellant, on this Point No. 4, interpolates the
word ''ultimate'' welfare, and argues that Or dell cannot give Janet a college education. But, as pointed out
in the Washington case of Schorno v. Schorno, supra,
there is nothing in this decision to prevent De\Ton from
doing so, when that stage is reached ..
It is &pparent that Ordell has not disparaged, and
is not vindictive, towards DeVon. She was willing, as
she testified, to take her into her home as one of her own
children, and to have continued to do so. On De \ron's
visits, she was always friendly, and fully cooperative.
·She pleaded for her and Neldon to be reunited, for
Janet's good. She kept De \Ton's picture for Janet, and
sent Janet's picture to De \ron. She praised De \ron to
Janet, and even tried to convince her that, if eventualities so resulted, she would have a nice home in California with her mother.
In the pleadings, and on her evidence here, she made
no attack upon De Von, although this Court has said that
cases like this are often bitter. True, she mentioned
De\7 on's smoking, and, on one occasion, drinking, but
that 'vas only when pressed, on cross-examination. She
evidenced no exception to or hatred on account of this.
•
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'Ve believe that the

Court, s conclusion that there is
not shown the background of stability, devotion, or reliability to insure that Janet's welfare would be bettered by
the change sought, is clearly right. This new 1narriage
and affluence could be prolonged or short-lived. Janet
would be a virtual stranger and step--child; second, certainly, to the younger baby in the Oliver home.
But, on the other hand, the Olivers can do much
to improve the background, and, as Janet gets older,
to allay her fears, and, perhaps, eventually satisfy
Ordell that Janet would be benefitted by being down
there. In short, the friendship and confide~ce can be
:.built up, all around. We are certain that Ordell will
not stand in the way of what, she is satisfied, would he
for Janet's good, whether it is a college education, or
whatever it may be.
In addition to Ordell's deep concern for Janet, it
is important to ~point out that the District Court, having
jurisdiction here, is charged with protecting Janet's
welfare. The Court, in this case, could not insure this
protection if she were taken from the State and from the
jurisdiction. The Hardcastles, in their circumstances,
could never know how she was treated. This is one of
Ordell 's chief concerns.
As indicated, also, in the Court's finding, as above
quoted, if Janet is kept within the jurisdiction of the
Court, she is within the area of her father's responsibility also. In addition to this, his rights and interests in
his child are enti tied to consideration.
Alley v. Alley, 247 P. 301, supra, points out the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

importance of keeping the child within the jurisdiction,
and states that the trial court, ''if possible'' should
''always maintain control ot the child and retain it within
the jurisdiction of the court so as to protect it against
harmful influences and to preserve its welfare . . . ''
State v. Sorensen., 132 P. (2) 132, 135, supra. In this
,case, the Court again emphasizes this, and quotes the
above language from the above case, and cites other Utah
cases.
In a case of this character, where the very persons,
seeking to have the custody of the child involved, were
before the trial Court, so that the Court has opportunity
to obse·rve their attitude and judge of their characters, it
seems that his judgment and discretion should not be
interferred with, unless a clear abuse is shown.
Noon v. Noon, 191 P. (2.) 35,_ 38 states and recites this
rule, and sup·ports it by the citation of a number of
cases.

Schorno v. Bphorrno, 172 P. (2) 474, cited supra, at
p. 478, says, in reference to this kind of a case:
"We have recognized that the trial court
must necessarily have a wide discretion in such
matters. This must be so because there are so
many factors that must be taken into consideration, and these can become better known by the
trial judge than they can by us from the printed
record.''
In Walton v. Coffm~, 169 P. (2) 97, 103, this Court
states substantially the principles recited in the above
two cases.
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'Ve respectfully subn1it that the findings and conelusions and judgment of the trial court are fully justified and sustained by the record, and should be affirmed.
~lULLlNER,

PRINCE and MUI_.~LINER
Attorneys for R-espondents

,
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